A New Model of Safety Management System for Railway Operation by Ge, Xiaocheng
University of Huddersfield Repository
Ge, Xiaocheng
A New Model of Safety Management System for Railway Operation
Original Citation
Ge, Xiaocheng (2017) A New Model of Safety Management System for Railway Operation. In: 
First International Conference on Rail Transportation,, 10­12 July 2017, Southwest Jiaotong 
University, Chengdu, China. (Unpublished) 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/32873/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not­for­profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
 First International Conference on Rail Transportation 
Chengdu, China, July 10-12, 2017 
 
 
A New Model of Safety Management System for Railway 
Operation 
Shang WU1*, Xiaocheng GE2 and Yanyun LUO1       
1.Institute of Rail Transit, Tongji University, Shanghai, 201804, China 
2.Institute of Railway Research, School of Computing and Engineering, University of 
Huddersfield, Huddersfield, HD1 3DH, UK 
 
 
 
Abstract: Safety management systems (SMSs) were introduced to the rail industry as a proactive 
way to manage safety and prevent accidents. However, accidents still occur where the SMS has been 
implemented but ineffective. It is, therefore, of great importance to have a reality check of what the 
role and functions of an SMS are in order to understand why the SMS does not prevent organisational 
accidents and to identify the weakness of SMS as underlying causes in accidents.  
This paper is a summary of the report based on previous research (Pan, 2014). It presents a systemic 
review of SMS elements based on analysis of accident reports and proposes an innovative SMS 
model in order to discover potential improvements for SMS implementation. The review based on 
selected accident reports focused on analysing the individual SMS elements involved in the accidents 
and identified the most critical elements in accidents are safety-related information management, risk 
assessment and competence management. The main findings from the research lie in the failure 
patterns of SMS elements in accidents, organisational features of the rail accidents, inadequate 
standards for SMS design, and industrial emphasis in implementation. We gave our recommendations 
on SMS implementations based on this review. And future research can be processed in the areas of 
improvement of the SMS model, detailed analysis of SMS involvement in the accidents, and the 
actual value of the SMS. 
Keywords: Railway safety; Safety management; Safety management system; Management system 
model 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The understanding of railway accidents and 
incidents has evolved with the increasing 
complexity in modern socio-technical 
environment. Many rail accidents, such as 
Clapham railway accident and Ladbroke Grove 
accident, occurred as a result of combining 
factors among the organisation and safety 
arrangements than pure human error or 
individual technical failure (Qureshi 2007, 
Evans 2010, RRSB 2011). Those complicated 
events, termed as organisational accidents, may 
originate from decisions and actions from people 
at any level, and taken at times and places quite 
far from the final accident (Reason, 1997, 
Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000). Since Safety 
Management System (SMS) as a proactive 
approach to systematically manage the safety 
throughout the whole organisation is widely 
required among the rail industry and other 
safety-critical industries, the benefits of adopting 
a SMS have been recognised across the industry 
(Fernández-Muñiz et al. 2007). As in rail 
industry, SMS has been embedded in a variety of 
standards, guidance and regulations across 
countries (Transport Canada 2001, European 
Union 2004, ROGS 2006, National Transport 
Commission Australia 2008). From both legal 
and beneficial perspective, an effective SMS is 
necessary in the railway operation to prevent 
potential accidents which can lead to huge losses 
of the organisation.  
Simply having a SMS in place does not 
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guarantee the success in managing safety. In 
general, major accidents still occur in many 
industries worldwide where the SMS was 
implemented but ineffective and, therefore, it is 
of great value to understand why SMS does not 
prevent the organisational accidents and to 
identify the weakness of a SMS as underlying 
causes in the accident. 
SMS is not a completely new system; rather it 
builds upon the existing safety principles and 
safety practices in the organisation to manage 
the safety from a proactive way (Bayuk 2008). 
As similar in other safety critical industries, the 
purpose of the SMS is to ensure safety operation 
through the systematic management in the 
railway. In UK, Railways and Other Guided 
Transport Systems Regulations (ROGS, 2006) 
states that: “safety management system is the 
basis for making sure a transport system runs 
safely and in line with ROGS.”  
By the time of this paper has been written, 
numerous research involving review and 
assessment of the SMS can be found in many 
safety-critical industries, for example in 
aerospace industry (McDonald et al. 2000, Gill 
and Shergill 2004, Liou et al. 2008, Hsu et al. 
2010), in construction industry (Tam et al. 2001, 
Tam et al. 2002, Chan et al. 2004, Ai Lin Teo 
and Yean Yng Ling 2006, Giretti et al. 2009), 
maritime industry (Trbojevic and Carr, 2000, Sii 
et al., 2001, Akyuz and Celik, 2014), in chemical 
industry (Mitchison and Porter, 1998, GAO and 
ZENG, 2005), and in food industry (Luning et 
al., 2009, Jacxsens et al., 2009).  
In the rail industry, many railway accident 
reports, e.g., from RAIB, do focus on aspects of 
the SMS (e.g. Ladbroke Grove, Potters Bar, and 
Waterfall). However these reports focus on 
particular accidents though, and there is a need 
to systematically examine across the entire 
industry, because learning from previous 
accidents is essential to prevent accidents by 
identifying the recurrent causes and potential 
actions for improvement. Unfortunately the 
existing research of statistical analysis of the 
accidents normally focuses on the technical parts 
or immediate causes. Therefore, reviewing the 
effectiveness of SMS from the underlying causes 
and contributory factors at managerial level is 
necessary and rewarding. 
On the other hand, we have been aware that 
the primary scope of the research in this paper is 
based on the official accident reports published 
by the UK Rail Accident Investigation Branch 
(RAIB, 2014). It is limited to the rail accidents 
occurred as a combination of factors of 
individual SMS elements involved in the 
reported accidents, incidents or near misses. 
The focus is on the systemic review of the SMS 
from accident side rather than the audit based on 
the checklists. In addition, safety culture has a 
great influence on safe operation and SMS is 
often considered as the situational part of the 
safety culture (HSE, 2005). We left the study of 
safety culture in the future work. This paper only 
focuses on the structural elements of the safety 
management, namely the objective arrangement 
within the SMS, rather than the culture or 
subjective aspects. 
 
 
2  Review of SMSs 
 
The complex nature of accidents has been 
recognised by safety researchers for years. The 
term ‘organisational accident’ is proposed to 
describe those accidents occurred due to the 
concatenation causes and factors from many 
levels in the social-technical system (Reason, 
1990). Unlike individual accident, which is 
frequent but less severe with limited causes, an 
organisational accident is defined as a 
comparatively rare event which has catastrophic 
consequences and multiple causes involving a 
variety of contributory factors combine to breach 
the defensive layers (Reason, 1997). And it 
worth knowing that another group of academics 
term such kind of accidents as ‘system 
accidents’, resulting from failures of multiple 
components (Perrow, 1984, Leveson, 2002). In 
this paper, from a managerial view to safety, we 
will use the term ‘organisational accident’, 
which is more intuitive to denote these modern 
complicated accidents involving organisational 
and social factors. The emerging of 
organisational accidents requires better and less 
subjective understanding of why these complex 
accidents happen and how to prevent future ones 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Somehow, the accident 
models, especially the organizational accident 
model, are more applicable in understanding the 
organizational accidents in socio-technical 
systems, and the weakness of safety 
management contributing to accident can be 
reflected in the models.  
 
2.1  Railway SMS Regulatory Requirements 
Railway as a complex system, engineering an 
adequate SMS is always a challenging task 
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(Patacchini 2011). In order to guide the design of 
the SMS, different scope and depth of the 
railway SMS requirements are defined by 
regulators in different countries based on the real 
operational circumstance and developmental 
stages. Table 1 provides a list of representative 
railway standards which enforce the 
requirements of railway SMS in different parts 
of the world. 
Table 1  SMS Requirements of Railway 
Safety Standards, Regulations or Guidelines 
in Different Regions 
Name of Standards / 
Regulations 
First 
Issued 
Year 
Scope 
Railway Safety 
Management System 
Regulations (Transport 
Canada, 2001) 
2001 Canada 
Railway Safety Directive 
2004/49/EC (European 
Union, 2004) 
2004 Europe 
The Railways and Other 
Guided Transport Systems 
(Safety) Regulations 2006 
(ROGS, 2006) 
2006 UK 
National Guideline for the 
Preparation of a Rail 
Safety Management 
System (National 
Transport Commission 
Australia, 2008) 
2008 Australia 
 
In Canada, Transport Canada’s Railway SMS 
Regulations (2001) define the SMS as a formal 
way to make the operations safely and to 
establish a safety culture to reduce the railway 
accidents, which includes safety goals and 
performance targets, risk assessments, 
responsibilities, rules and procedures, 
monitoring and evaluation, and the requirements 
of documented systems and procedures is 
enforced in the SMS among the railway 
companies.  
In Europe, European Union defines a railway 
SMS as "the organisation and arrangements 
established by an infrastructure manager or a 
railway undertaking to ensure the safe 
management of its operations" in the European 
Union Railway Safety Directive (2004). A 
related guidance for SMS has published, based 
on the directive, representing key elements of 
the SMS in three groups: processes for design 
and improvement, processes for implementation 
and operational activities (Patacchini, 2011). For 
the sake of interoperability demand, UK has 
introduced the Railways and Other Guided 
Transport Systems Regulations (ROGS) since 
2006, which prescribes a set of requirements for 
the SMS in mainline and non-mainline rail 
network. Four main purposes for the railway 
SMS are identified in the guidance, defining 
roles and responsibilities to ensure the transport 
system can run safely, arranging the managers to 
control the SMS, showing the involvement of 
workers and their representatives, and making 
sure the continuously improvement of the 
operator (ROGS, 2006). 
In Australia, National Transport Commission 
Australia (2008) published the national 
guidelines to explain the legislative requirements 
of SMS for rail transport operators contained in 
the Rail Safety Bill 2006 or Rail Safety 
Regulations 2006 in Australia, in order to 
achieve a high level of safety awareness and 
commitment throughout all parts of the rail 
transport operator. The guidelines summarise the 
requirements in the form of the SMS and the 
content of the SMS determined by legislation 
and the rail safety regulator, and highlight the 
mandatory process of safety management plan 
and the consultation before designing the SMS 
(National Transport Commission Australia, 
2008). 
 
2.2  Basic elements of Railway SMS  
There is no complete consensus on the contents 
of the railway SMS due to the different 
regulatory authorities in different countries and 
requirements for different types of operators 
(Robson et al., 2007), but a reasonable degree of 
agreement can be achieved on what an SMS 
must cover (Evans, 2010). According to the 
official guidance to ROGS in UK (ORR, 2014), 
with the compliance to the European Railway 
Safety Directive (Patacchini, 2011), the basic 
elements of a SMS are: 
 Safety policy statement, signed by Chief 
Executive, shared with all staff.  
 Safety targets, for maintaining and 
improving both qualitative and quantitative 
safety performance. 
 Procedures for meeting standards and other 
prescriptive conditions and procedures to 
assure the through life compliance.  
 Risk assessments and controlling new risk, 
managing the change of the operating 
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conditions or new risks imposed by new 
equipment.  
 Training and skills, to ensure the staff 
competence.  
 Managing the safety-related information 
within and between organizations through 
different ways of communication.  
 Responding to accidents, incidents, near 
misses, and other dangerous occurrences, 
learning from accident to improve the 
safety management.  
 Emergency planning, developing 
arrangements for responding to 
emergencies, with the agreement from 
appropriate public authorities. 
 Internal auditing, to review and assess 
whether SMS is effective. 
The contents specified by the regulation or 
official guidelines primarily provide the 
fundamental statement of the SMS. From a 
practical point of view, the detail contents and 
depth of the SMS should be adapted to fit the 
size and nature of the business (ROGS, 2006).  
 
2.2  Models of SMS 
Since the requirement and importance of SMS in 
railway are widely recognised and enforced, the 
question is more about the successful 
implementation and development of SMS than 
the adaptation. Great efforts have been done in 
the industry to produce a comprehensive model 
of SMS, combined with the requirements and 
elements for the best practice, which can be used 
to guide the design, implementation, and 
assessment of the organisation’s management of 
safety. 
European Railway Agency (ERA) adopts a 
system-based approach to model the SMS based 
on the process of design, planning, delivery and 
control of operation (Patacchini, 2011). A tool 
named ‘SMS wheel’ (ERA, 2014) is developed 
as the result, which contains three main parts: 
 design and improvement, 
 implementation, 
 operational activities. 
Each of them has a two level classification 
into more detailed components. Totally 10 
principal elements and 32 sub-components are 
defined in the SMS wheel. The model is 
available on the ERA’s website (ERA, 2014). 
In UK, the UK Office of Rail Regulation 
(ORR, 2011) develops Railway Management 
Maturity Model (RM3) to describe an effective 
safety management, which can be used to 
examine the SMS. According to RM3, the key 
elements of a railway SMS are as followed: 
 governance, policy and leadership, 
 organising for control and 
communication, 
 securing the co-operation and 
competence, 
 planning and implementing, 
 monitoring, audit and review. 
These five areas are further divided into 26 
items, as seen in Fig. 1, which together can form 
the criteria and sub-criteria to be reviewed. More 
detailed description for the criteria can be found 
in ORR’s report (ORR, 2011).  
 
 
Fig. 1 Railway Management Maturity Model 
(RM3) (ORR, 2011)  
 
 
3  Developing a new SMS model 
 
Before we present the new SMS model, first of 
all, a precondition for evaluation of a SMS is to 
determine what main elements comprise the 
SMS. Unavoidably, SMS elements are not 
completely individual and overlap to some 
extent.  This is also a leading reason that no 
unified model is agreed across the industry. 
Taking account of the defined SMS elements 
from whether regulations (European Union, 
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2004, ORR, 2014) or industrial models 
(Patacchini, 2011, ORR, 2011) are either too 
elementary or too elaborative, we consider to 
develop an intermediate one.  
The existing models often build the SMS 
model as the process of the management, which 
allows the SMS elements to be organised from 
the operational viewpoint. In this paper, SMS 
elements are organised from an innovated point 
of view, the management of different aspects. 
Based on the regulatory requirements from 
ROGS (ORR, 2014), combined with the most 
obvious sections of the SMS in the RM3 model 
(ORR, 2011), the fundamental SMS elements 
are determined to develop the new model, 
defined as ‘SMS House Model’, which can be 
seen in Fig. 2.  
The new model sees the SMS as the 
management of different objects within the 
organisation to ensure the safety. Under the top 
level arrangement through safety policy and 
safety target, the management of safety is 
conducted from equipment, information, human 
and organisational learning, with the compliance 
of the standards. This model may have 
deficiencies in representing the process of the 
management, it offers an innovative way to 
describe the SMS containing all the basic legal 
elements (ORR, 2014), however. The detailed 
descriptions of the SMS elements from this 
structure are illustrated in Table 2. 
Fig. 2  SMS House Model  
The SMS House Model illustrates the SMS 
like a ‘house’. The top level arrangement, safety 
policy and safety target, is like the ‘roof’ which 
covers and protects all the SMS elements in the 
‘house’. Under the ‘roof’, the ‘house’ is divided 
into four ‘rooms’, each represents the 
management of one objects, equipment, human, 
information and organisational learning. For 
each particular object, more detailed 
arrangements are designed, namely the SMS 
elements. Emergency planning is like the 
emergency facilities of the ‘rooms’ that protect 
the equipment, human and information in the 
emergency. Under the main structure of the 
‘house’, the ‘groundwork’ is the compliance 
with standards, which is the base of the SMS 
that all the arrangements of safety management 
should be based on this element. If there is one 
or two elements fail, minor accidents may 
appear. When multiple elements fail, serious 
accidents could occur. The ‘roof’ and 
‘groundwork’ are the key elements that directly 
can impact the other parts of the SMS. Therefore, 
the whole structure clearly describes the SMS as 
the management of different targets in the 
organisation. 
The strength of the model is its ability to 
portray the SMS structure visually and to be 
well-understood. It provides an explicit structure 
for both the design and review of the SMS. As in 
this paper, the model can be used to examine the 
implementation of the SMS by way of reviewing 
whether there are failures in the management of 
each object that result in unwanted events. 
Specifically, accidents can be reviewed to see 
which SMS elements are involved as the 
contributory or underlying factors, and further to 
identify which objects have inadequate safety 
management. 
Normally, failures in elements of SMS can 
traced back to the weakness in the top level 
arrangement, in form of safety policy and safety 
target. Thus, when reviewing the individual SMS 
elements contributing to adverse events, safety 
policy and safety target are not included in this 
paper. 
 
 
4  Evaluating the new SMS model 
 
In line with the research scope in the UK, Rail 
Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB, 2014) as 
UK’s independent investigation body for railway 
accidents and incidents is considered to be the 
desirable accident database for the study. In spite 
of the existing of other database, like Safety 
Management Information System (SMIS) and 
National Incident Reporting (NIR), most are not 
fully public and available as the RAIB. The 
primary aim of RAIB is to improve the railway 
safety and prevent the potential accidents and 
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incidents through analysing their causes and 
circumstances, along with any other contributory 
or underlying factors that result in the event or 
aggravate the outcome (RAIB, 2014). Therefore, 
the accident reports from the RAIB, including 
accidents, incidents, near misses and other 
dangerous occurrences, offer the sufficient 
information for this study.  
There are three criteria defined in screening the 
accident samples. 
 Accidents occurred since 2007 and have 
been fully reported. This is considering the 
legal requirements of SMS in UK were put 
into force in late 2006. 
 Accidents occurred not due to the third 
party. This is considering the research scope 
of the railway domain. RAIB has the 
classification based on immediate causes 
with one category of third party, which is 
helpful for the screening. 
 Accidents occurred not simply from the 
individual human error of technical failure, 
such as suicide, level crossing misuse, etc. 
This is considering the research targets of 
understanding the organisational factors of 
accidents. RAIB aims at the investigation 
with potential for significant learning and 
improvement of safety and, therefore, most 
are subject to this criterion. 
To date, totally 166 accidents, incidents or 
near misses which occurred since 2007 have 
completely reports published on RAIB website, 
among which, nearly 78% of the occurrences are 
on the heavy rail. Totally 98 heavy rail accidents, 
9 light rail accidents, 11 metro meet the another 
two screening criteria.  
Considering the accident pattern may differ 
from different railway types, the review work 
starts with the accident samples of heavy rails. 
Twenty samples of heavy rail accidents are 
randomly selected based on different immediate 
causes in order to have more generalised results. 
Five samples are selected for each for other 
railway types, which may not reliable in 
obtaining common patterns due to the limited 
data, but are available for reference.  
After reviewing the whole accident samples, 
the data are collected to generate the further 
analysis. A general picture of how SMS is 
discussed and deemed within the accident 
investigations can be portrayed. Statistic results 
can be obtained to reflect the effectiveness of 
each SMS elements across the industry. The 
most frequent elements, contributing to adverse 
events, are regarded as the critical parts of the 
SMS, and required for further attentions and 
improvements. The weaknesses that appear 
together can be perceived, which is of value in 
the implementation and review/audit of SMS. 
Finally, the result can also manifest whether 
each object defined in the SMS House Model is 
well managed or no. 
 
4.1  Reviewing Accident Reports   
Table 3 illustrates the involvement of each SMS 
elements in contributing to the accident from the 
sample study, with the summary of the accident 
samples each element involved and the 
occurrence rate of elements involved in the 
accidents. A more clear depiction for the result 
is shown in Fig 3. 
 
Fig. 3  Occurrence rate of SMS elements 
4.1.1 Critical SMS Elements in Accidents     
From the result, the most critical SMS 
elements, most frequently involved in the causes 
of accidents, are safety-related information 
management, risk assessment and competence 
management. They are more likely to be 
identified as ineffective or inadequate in around 
half of the accident samples. Besides, control of 
contractors, and responsibility and 
accountability are also showing the weakness in 
around one third accident samples, respectively.  
The weaknesses of asset management, 
workload management, accident/incident 
reporting and investigation and compliance with 
standards are all identified three or four times in 
the accident samples. It is worth noting that 
although failures in compliance with standards 
result in three accidents in the sample study, 
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another three investigation reports mentioned the 
lack of clear standards or guidance as the 
contributory factors. As for the industry, it is 
vital to have appropriate and sufficient standards 
in place for the purpose of a better SMS practice. 
4.1.2 Less Critical SMS Elements in Accidents     
According to the above results, documentation, 
change management and emergency planning 
are less likely to cause the accidents or 
exacerbate the consequences, with only one or 
two involvements in the accident samples. They 
are considered to be more effective in the 
management with fewer failures to be identified. 
It is to be expected that emergency planning will 
most often be mentioned in very big accidents, 
since these accidents require a huge amount of 
resources and services for rescue, involved in 
multiple organisations. Facing severe accidents, 
emergency arrangement is easy to be inadequate 
and unorganised. From the above investigation, 
the defects in emergency planning are indeed 
mentioned in the most serious accident, the 
derailment at Grayrigg. Besides, another 
incident showed the lack of emergency planning 
in the evacuation. Emergency planning is 
primarily for the mitigation of the consequences 
of the accidents, which is, notwithstanding, less 
likely to cause the adverse events, the 
importance is evident in preventing the accidents 
to have more detrimental effects. 
The weakness in internal auditing of SMS 
does not mentioned in all the sample reports. 
This is might because of the nature of this 
element with the purpose of examining the 
weakness of the whole SMS. Weakness of all 
other individual components can be deemed as 
the lack of internal auditing in some ways. 
4.1.3 Combining Factors 
Most investigation reports have identified the 
weakness in combining elements as the 
underlying causes. It can be found that the more 
severity the accident is, the more combining 
elements might be. Such as the derailment in 
Grayrigg, the most serious accident both in the 
samples and in UK since 2007, has the weakness 
in nine SMS elements.  
Furthermore, weaknesses of some elements 
are likely to appear together. More than half of 
involvements of control of contractors are 
combined with and safety-related information 
management. Competence management and 
responsibility and accountability are together in 
four accidents. 
The results from Table 3 and Figure 3 are 
more apparent to show the combination of the 
failures in the SMS House Model. The weakness 
of equipment, human and information 
management in the accidents are all obvious that 
each are involved in more than half of the 
accidents. Organisational learning is both 
smaller and always overlapping with at least two 
other things, having less direct influence in the 
accidents. In particular, 75% of the accidents 
have the contributory factors from the 
inadequate management of more than one area. 
30% of the accidents involve more than three 
aspects. One accident is caused by the 
combination of failures in all four areas in the 
House Model, which is also the biggest accident 
in the sample, Grayigg derailment.  
These demonstrate the nature of 
organisational accident that appeared from 
interacting causes from different levels of the 
organisation. An exception is human factors. 
Three out of the twenty accidents had only 
human factors, and more than half of the 
accidents with human SMS issues had at most 
one other category of issue. 
 
4.2  Key Findings 
On the basis of the results and analysis above, 
the initial findings from the review can be 
summarised as follows. 
• Safety-related information management, 
risk assessment and competence management 
are the most critical SMS elements which are 
more frequently failed and lead to adverse 
events. They indicate the weakness of the 
railway SMS in implementation.  
• Most accidents occurred due to the failures 
in the safety management of more than one 
aspect, which indicates the organisational nature 
of the accidents in the railway that requires the 
integrated management within the SMS. 
• Organisational learning is always 
combined with other managed areas in the 
accidents and less directly contributes to the 
accidents. Considering it has influences on all 
the areas in the model, it is more appropriate to 
be part of foundation in the SMS House Model. 
• Failure in compliance with standards is 
appeared occasionally and contributes to the 
accidents, but a more significant issue in some 
accidents is the lack of clear standards or 
industrial guidance, which can give rise to the 
recurrent accidents across the whole industry. 
• Although the requirement of SMS is 
First International Conference on Rail Transportation 2017 
 
different for mainline and non-mainline 
railways, the pattern of the effectiveness of each 
SMS components of light rails and metros is 
similar to that of heavy rails. 
• Heritage railways are still lack of formal 
and adequate SMS, and the need to design the 
suitable SMS with compliance is urgent. 
• Review of the SMS from accidents is more 
reliable for heavy rails since the accident data is 
sufficient. In terms of other types of railways, 
the total number of accidents is limited and the 
result may not be generalizable, only available 
for reference here. 
• The exact term ‘SMS’ is rarely used in the 
accident reports. It might be a defect of the 
investigation or reporting. A potential reason can 
be the entire SMS is existed and generally 
completed in the circumstance of these 
accidents, and only the direct parts involved 
from the organisational or managerial viewpoint 
are considered to be worthwhile to be discussed. 
This is due to the frequent discussion about the 
SMS in some accident reports on heritage 
railways. 
Furthermore, we carried out our analysis with 
additional accident reportThe result of the 
additional samples is summarised in Table 4 
with the comparison between the original 
samples. The most critical and less critical 
elements are consistent with some differences. 
In particular, risk assessment, safety-related 
information management, and competence 
management are all identified as the most 
frequent occurred problems in the two sets. 
Meanwhile, change management, 
documentation, workload management, 
reporting and investigation, and emergency 
planning are appeared in the original set but not 
in the additional set.  
Table 2 Descriptions of SMS Elements 
Managed Object SMS Elements Description 
Top Level 
Arrangement 
Safety Policy and 
Safety Target 
Setting the top level safety policy and target to provide a clear direction for 
the organisation to follow. 
Equipment 
Risk Assessment 
Procedures to make sure the potential hazards are identified, with the 
connected risks are assessed and controlled.  
Change 
Management 
The process to control risks from changes in the existing and new projects in 
terms of identifying new hazards and taking actions before implementing 
the change. 
Asset Management 
Managing the assets (mostly physical) to achieve effective service delivery 
and maintenance of associated risks for the strategic and regulatory targets. 
Control of 
Contractors 
The management of the delivery of safe-related supplies and services 
provided by the suppliers, partners and subcontractors. 
Information 
Safety-related 
Information 
Management 
Managing the safety-related information within and between organizations 
through different ways of communication. 
Documentation Written SMS and the management of documents 
Human 
Workload 
Management 
The management of providing the sufficient and right (human and technical) 
resources to complete the tasks, including a reasonable arrangement to 
prevent the potential of fatigue and pressure. 
Responsibility and 
Accountability 
A clear distribution of roles and responsibilities, with good management and 
supervision in place to deliver safe operations. 
Competence 
Management 
Management of training and skills with periodic assessment, to ensure the 
staff competence. 
Organisational 
Learning 
Accident / incident 
reporting and 
investigation 
Responding to accidents, incidents, near misses, and other dangerous 
occurrences, learning from accident to improve the safety management. 
Internal Auditing 
Periodically reviewing and assessing whether SMS is effective, and 
identifying the improvements. 
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Table 3  Summary of SMS Elements involved in Selected Accidents 
SMS Elements Involvement in Accidents (Sample ID) Total 
Occurrence 
Rate 
Risk Assessment 01, 04, 05, 07, 09, 13, 14, 18, 20 9 45.00% 
Change Management 15 1 5.00% 
Asset Management 01, 02, 08, 11 4 20.00% 
Control of Contractors 01, 02, 05, 07, 09, 15, 19 7 35.00% 
Safety-related Information 
Management 
01, 04, 06, 08, 09, 11, 13, 15, 17,19, 20 11 55.00% 
Documentation 03, 18 2 10.00% 
Workload Management 01, 05, 16 3 15.00% 
Responsibility and Accountability 01, 06, 07, 08, 10, 12 6 30.00% 
Competence Management 01, 03, 05, 08, 10, 11, 12, 14 8 40.00% 
Accident / incident reporting and 
investigation 
01, 14, 19 3 15.00% 
Internal Auditing / 0 0.00% 
Emergency Planning 01, 07 2 10.00% 
Compliance with Standards 05, 06, 18 3 15.00% 
 
Table 4  Similarity between Original and Additional accident Samples 
SMS Elements 
Original 
Samples Si 
Occurrence Rate 
Ri 
Additional Samples 
S′i 
Occurrence 
Rate R′i 
Risk Assessment 9 45.00% 2 40% 
Change Management 1 5.00% 0 0% 
Asset Management 4 20.00% 2 40% 
Control of Contractors 7 35.00% 1 20% 
 Multiple 
Emergency 
Planning 
Developing arrangements for responding to emergencies, with the 
agreement from appropriate public authorities 
Compliance with 
Standards 
Procedures for meeting standards and other prescriptive conditions and 
procedures to assure the through life compliance. 
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Safety-related Information 
Management 
11 55.00% 3 60% 
Documentation 2 10.00% 0 0% 
Workload Management 3 15.00% 0 0% 
Responsibility and Accountability 6 30.00% 1 20% 
Competence Management 8 40.00% 2 40% 
Accident / incident reporting and 
investigation 
3 15.00% 0 0% 
Internal Auditing 0 0.00% 0 0% 
Emergency Planning 2 10.00% 0 0% 
Compliance with Standards 3 15.00% 1 20% 
5  Conclusions 
 
An innovated SMS House Model is developed to 
provide the SMS structure from a different point 
of view, and to determine the fundamental SMS 
elements to be reviewed. Based on SMS House 
Model, the overall process of the review is 
presented, including the criteria for accident 
screening to obtain the suitable accident data, 
form for collecting the accident information, and 
methods to identify the SMS weakness. 
Considering the different characteristics and 
circumstance may lead to different patterns, the 
reviews is conducted separately on heavy rails, 
light rails, metros and heritage railways.  
As the principal finding from the review, 
safety-related information management, risk 
assessment and competence management are 
identified as the most critical SMS elements 
which are more frequently failed and lead to 
adverse events. Besides, most accidents manifest 
the nature of organisational accident with the 
identification of combing factors in the safety 
management of equipment, human, information 
and organisational learning in the House Model. 
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